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Abstract
Behavioral game theory seeks to describe the way actual people (as compared to ide-
alized, “rational” agents) act in strategic situations. Our own recent work has identified
iterative models (such as quantal cognitive hierarchy) as the state of the art for predict-
ing human play in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2012,
2016). Iterative models predict that agents reason iteratively about their opponents, build-
ing up from a specification of nonstrategic behavior called level-0. The modeler is in
principle free to choose any description of level-0 behavior that makes sense for the given
setting. However, in practice almost all existing work specifies this behavior as a uniform
distribution over actions. In most games it is not plausible that even nonstrategic agents
would choose an action uniformly at random, nor that other agents would expect them to
do so. A more accurate model for level-0 behavior has the potential to dramatically im-
prove predictions of human behavior, since a substantial fraction of agents may play level-0
strategies directly, and furthermore since iterative models ground all higher-level strategies
in responses to the level-0 strategy. Our work considers models of the way in which level-0
agents construct a probability distribution over actions, given an arbitrary game. Using a
Bayesian optimization package called SMAC (Hutter, Hoos, & Leyton-Brown, 2010, 2011,
2012), we systematically evaluated a large space of such models, each of which makes its
prediction based only on general features that can be computed from any normal form
game. In the end, we recommend a model that achieved excellent performance across the
board: a linear weighting of features that requires the estimation of four weights. We
evaluated the effects of combining this new level-0 model with several iterative models, and
observed large improvements in the models’ predictive accuracies.
1. Introduction
It is well known that the standard game-theoretic assumption that agents will adopt Nash
equilibrium strategies—where each agent simultaneously responds optimally to all the others—
is often a poor predictor of actual human behavior (e.g., Goeree & Holt, 2001). This is a
particular problem for researchers building artificially intelligent systems to interact with hu-
mans in strategic settings, such as randomized security protocols (e.g., Pita, Jain, Marecki,
Ordo´n˜ez, Portway, Tambe, Western, Paruchuri, & Kraus, 2008; Jain, Tsai, Pita, Kiek-
intveld, Rathi, Tambe, & Ordo´n˜ez, 2010; Yin, Jiang, Tambe, Kiekintveld, Leyton-Brown,
Sandholm, & Sullivan, 2012; Yang, Kiekintveld, Ordo´n˜ez, Tambe, & John, 2013) or nego-
tiation (e.g., Gal & Pfeffer, 2007; Wolpert & Bono, 2013). The field of behavioral game
theory aims to develop models that more accurately describe human strategic behavior, as
∗. An early version of this work was published as (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2014).
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evaluated using experimental data (Camerer, 2003). Our own recent work has identified
one particular model, quantal cognitive hierarchy—an extension of the cognitive hierarchy
model of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004)—as the state of the art behavioral model for pre-
dicting human play in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games (Wright & Leyton-Brown,
2012, 2016). The quantal cognitive hierarchy (QCH) model has two key components.
The first component is quantal response; that is, agents respond stochastically to their
incentives—playing high utility actions with high probability and low utility actions with
low probability—rather than best responding. This expresses the intuition that two actions
that yield roughly equal utilities have a roughly equal chance of being chosen. The second
component is iterative reasoning ; that is, agents do not reason arbitrarily deeply about their
opponents’ beliefs about beliefs about beliefs, but instead start from a simple nonstrategic1
(level-0) behavior, and then reason for some fixed number of iterations about responses to
that starting point (e.g., a level-2 agent quantally best responds to the combined behaviors
of level-1 and level-0 agents).
Thus, in order to make use of a quantal cognitive hierarchy model one must first commit
to a specification of level-0 behavior. Indeed, this is true of iterative models in general, such
as cognitive hierarchy (Camerer et al., 2004) and level-k (Stahl & Wilson, 1994; Nagel,
1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, & Broseta, 2001). It is important to get this specification
right, for two reasons. First, there is growing evidence that a substantial fraction of human
players do act nonstrategically (e.g., Burchardi & Penczynski, 2012). Second, a level-0
model also drives predictions that are made about strategic agents: higher-level agents are
assumed to act by responding strategically to lower-level agents’ behavior.
Almost all work in the literature that uses iterative models adopts the specification that
level-0 agents play a uniform distribution over actions. (In Section 5 we discuss the few
exceptions of which we are aware, each of which is based on an explicitly encoded intuition
about a specific setting of interest.) The uniform-distribution approach has the advantage
that it does not require insight into a game’s structure, and hence can be applied to any
game. However, in many games it is not plausible that an agent would choose an action
uniformly at random, nor that any other agent would expect them to do so. For example,
consider a dominated action that always yields very low payoffs for all players.
In this paper we consider the question of how to do better. Specifically, we investigate
general rules that can be used to induce a level-0 specification from the normal-form de-
scription of an arbitrary game. In the next section we formally define our setting, and
describe the data, methods, and model that we used in our work. In Section 3 we define the
space of richer level-0 models that we searched. We did this in two different ways: using
a manual forward-selection procedure, and using a Bayesian optimization procedure. We
define these procedures and analyze the models that they selected in Section 4. Notably,
we found that the richer level-0 models improved performance in the all of the iterative
models that we considered, even though they were selected based only their impact on the
performance of the Spike-Poisson QCH model. We then briefly survey some related work
in Section 5 before concluding in Section 6.
1. We refer to agents that form explicit beliefs about the behavior of other agents as “strategic” and the
alternative as “nonstrategic”. Nonstrategic should thus not be taken as a synonym for unsophisticated
or thoughtless; some of the level-0 behavior that we describe in what follows is rather sophisticated.
2
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2. Framework
We focus on unrepeated, simultaneous-move normal-form games. Formally, a normal-form
game G is a tuple (N,A, u), where N is a finite set of agents; A =
∏
i∈N Ai is the set of
possible action profiles; Ai is the finite set of actions available to agent i; u = {ui}i∈N
is a set of utility functions ui : A → R, each of which maps from an action profile to a
utility for agent i. Let ∆(X) denote the set of probability distributions over a finite set
X. Overloading notation, we represent the expected utility of a profile of mixed strategies
s ∈ S = ∏i∈N ∆(Ai) by ui(s). By a−i we refer to the joint actions of all agents except i.
Our objective is to find a behavioral model that maps from a game G and a (human) agent
i to a probability distribution over i’s action set Ai that predicts i’s behavior in G. In this
section we first describe a model that we have shown achieves state-of-the-art performance
in predicting human behavior, Spike-Poisson QCH (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2016). We
then describe the dataset and methods that we used to learn parameters and evaluate the
performance of extensions to Spike-Poisson QCH.
2.1 Quantal Cognitive Hierarchy
The first key component of the quantal cognitive hierarchy model is quantal best response,
in which errors become less likely as they become more costly. Like most of the behavioral
game theory literature, we use the logit specification of this concept.
Definition 1 (Quantal best response). Let ui(ai, s−i) be agent i’s expected utility when
playing action ai against strategy profile s−i. Then a quantal best response QBRi(s−i;λ)
by agent i to s−i is a mixed strategy si such that
si(ai) =
exp[λ · ui(ai, s−i)]∑
a′i
exp[λ · ui(a′i, s−i)]
, (1)
where λ (the precision) represents agents’ sensitivity to utility differences.
Unlike (classical) best response, which is a set-valued function, quantal best response
always returns a single mixed strategy. When λ = 0, quantal response mixes uniformly over
all of the agents’ actions; as λ→∞, quantal best response approaches best response.
The second key component of the quantal cognitive hierarchy model is iterative response,
in which higher-level agents reason about and respond to lower-level agents. Describing the
distribution of different levels in the population of agents is a crucial decision. We use the
Spike-Poisson specification of this distribution (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2016)
Definition 2 (Spike-Poisson QCH model). Let Poisson(m; τ) denote a Poisson distribution
with mean τ evaluated at index m. Let
g(m) =
{
+ (1− )Poisson(m; τ) if m = 0,
(1− )Poisson(m; τ) otherwise.
Let QBRi(s−i;λ) denote i’s quantal best response to the strategy profile s−i, given precision
parameter λ. Let
pii,0:m =
m∑
`=0
g(`)
pii,`∑m
`′=0 g(`
′)
3
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be the truncated distribution over actions predicted for an agent conditional on that agent’s
having level 0 ≤ ` ≤ m. Now we can define pii,m ∈ ∆(Ai), the distribution over actions
predicted for an agent i with level m by the Spike-Poisson QCH model:
pi∅i,0(ai) = |Ai|−1
pii,m(ai) = QBRi(pii,0:m−1;λ).
Notice that pi∅i,0 is just the uniform distribution; that is, level-0 agents randomize uniformly
among their actions. In Sections 3 and 4, we will construct more plausible definitions of
level-0 behavior by replacing pi∅i,0 with richer distributions. This baseline model thus has
three parameters: the mean of the Poisson distribution τ , the spike probability , and
the precision λ. The overall predicted distribution of actions is a weighted sum of the
distributions for each level:
Pr(ai‖G, τ, , λ) =
∞∑
`=0
g(`)pii,`(ai).
In previous work, we found that the distributions of levels best supported by experimen-
tal data tended to have a large proportion of level-0 agents (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2012,
2016). The Spike-Poisson specification of the level distribution allows for precise tuning of
the fraction of level-0 agents, while also allowing the modeling of higher-level agents. At the
same time, it requires only two parameters, unlike a categorical distribution which requires
a number of parameters equal to the maximum level minus one.
2.2 Data
We analyzed data from the ten experimental studies summarized in Table 1. In Stahl and
Wilson (1994) experimental subjects played 10 normal-form games for points, where every
point represented a 1% chance (per game) of winning $2.50. Participants stood to earn
between $0.25 and $25.00 based on their play in the games. In Stahl and Wilson (1995),
subjects played 12 normal-form games, where each point gave a 1% chance (per game) of
winning $2.00. Participants stood to earn between $0.00 and $24.00 based on their play in
the games. In Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (1998) subjects played 18 normal-form
games, with each point of payoff worth 40 cents. However, subjects were paid based on
the outcome of only one randomly-selected game. Participants stood to earn between $7.84
and $36.16 based on their play in the games. Goeree and Holt (2001) presented 10 games
in which subjects’ behavior was close to that predicted by Nash equilibrium, and 10 other
small variations on the same games in which subjects’ behavior was not well-predicted by
Nash equilibrium. The payoffs for each game were denominated in pennies. We included the
10 games that were in normal form. Participants stood to earn between $−1.02 and $23.30
based on their play in these 10 games. In Cooper and Van Huyck (2003), agents played the
normal forms of 8 games, followed by extensive form games with the same induced normal
forms; we include only the data from the normal-form games. Payoffs were denominated
in 10 cent units. Participants stood to earn between $0.80 and $4.80 based on their play
in the games. In Haruvy, Stahl, and Wilson (2001), subjects played 15 symmetric 3 × 3
normal form games. The payoffs were points representing a percentage chance of winning
4
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$2.00 for each game. Participants stood to earn between $0.00 and $30.00 based on their
play in the games. In Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker (2008), subjects played 14 games, and
were paid $0.15 per point in one randomly-chosen game. Participants stood to earn between
$1.83 and $14.13 based on their play in the games. In Haruvy and Stahl (2007), subjects
played 20 games, again for payoff points representing a percentage chance of winning $2.00
per game. Participants stood to earn between $1.05 and $17.40 based on their play in the
games. Stahl and Haruvy (2008) presented new data on 15 games that contain strategies
that are dominated in ways that are “obvious” to varying degrees, again for percentage
chances of winning $2.00 per game. Participants stood to earn between $0.00 and $17.55
based on their play in the games. Finally, in Rogers, Palfrey, and Camerer (2009), subjects
played 17 normal-form games, with payoffs denominated in pennies. Participants stood to
earn between $2.31 and $13.33 based on their play in the games.
We represent the data for each game Gi as a pair (Gi, {aij}) containing the game itself
and a set of observed actions in the game. All games had two players, so each single play of
a game generated two observations. We built one such dataset for each study, as listed in
Table 1. We also constructed a combined dataset, dubbed All10, containing data from all
the datasets. The datasets contained very different numbers of observations, ranging from
400 (Stahl & Wilson, 1994) to 2992 (Cooper & Van Huyck, 2003). To ensure that each fold
had approximately the same population of subjects and games, we evaluated All10 using
stratified cross-validation, ensuring that the number of games from each source dataset was
approximately equal in each partition element. We also renormalized all games so that
their payoffs were expressed in expected cents. This is important because the precision
parameter for quantal response is not scale invariant : the correct value of λ can differ
depending upon the units in which payoffs are expressed. As described earlier, in some
datasets, payoff points were worth a certain number of cents; in others, points represented
percentage chances of winning a certain sum, or were otherwise in expected units. Table 1
lists the number of expected cents that we deemed each payoff point to be worth for the
purpose of this normalization.
2.3 Methods
Models cannot be evaluated unless their parameters are instantiated; we set parameters
to values that maximized the likelihood the model assigned to a training dataset. We
perform this likelihood maximization using the Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution
Strategy (CMA-ES) algorithm (Hansen & Ostermeier, 2001). We then score a given model’s
performance by the likelihood it assigned to a test dataset, consisting entirely of games (and,
hence, observations) that were not used for estimating parameters. Randomly dividing our
experimental data into training and test sets introduces variance into the prediction score,
since the exact value of the score depends partly upon the random division. To reduce this
variance, we perform 10 rounds of 10-fold cross-validation. Specifically, for each round, we
randomly order the games and then divide them into 10 equal-sized parts. For each of the
10 ways of selecting 9 parts from the 10, we compute the maximum likelihood estimate
of the model’s parameters based on the observations associated with the games of those 9
parts. We then determine the likelihood of the remaining part given the prediction. We call
the average of this quantity across all 10 parts the cross-validated likelihood. The average
5
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Table 1: Names and contents of each dataset. Units are in expected value, in US dollars.
Name Source Games n Units
SW94 Stahl and Wilson (1994) 10 400 $0.025
SW95 Stahl and Wilson (1995) 12 576 $0.02
CGCB98 Costa-Gomes et al. (1998) 18 1566 $0.022
GH01 Goeree and Holt (2001) 10 500 $0.01
CVH03 Cooper and Van Huyck (2003) 8 2992 $0.10
HSW01 Haruvy et al. (2001) 15 869 $0.02
HS07 Haruvy and Stahl (2007) 20 2940 $0.02
CGW08 Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker
(2008)
14 1792 $0.0107
SH08 Stahl and Haruvy (2008) 18 1288 $0.02
RPC08 Rogers et al. (2009) 17 1210 $0.01
All10 Union of above 142 13863 per source
(across rounds) of the cross-validated likelihoods is distributed according to a Student’s-t
distribution (e.g., Witten & Frank, 2000). We compare the predictive power of different
behavioral models on a given dataset by comparing the average cross-validated likelihood
of the dataset under each model. We say that one model predicts significantly better than
another when the 95% confidence intervals for the average cross-validated likelihoods do
not overlap.
In Section 4.4, we analyze posterior distributions over the parameters of the models we
consider. To compute these posteriors, we used Metropolis-Hastings sampling to estimate
the posterior distribution. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) algorithm (e.g., Robert & Casella, 2004) that computes a series of values
from the support of a distribution. Although each value depends upon the previous value,
the values are distributed as if from an independent sample of the distribution after a
sufficiently large number of iterations. MCMC algorithms (and related techniques, e.g.,
annealed importance sampling (Neal, 2001)) are useful for estimating multidimensional
distributions for which a closed form of the density is unknown. They require only that a
value proportional to the true density be computable (i.e., an unnormalized density). This
is precisely the case with the models that we seek to estimate. We used a flat prior for all
parameters.
3. Level-0 Model
In this section we present the components from which we will construct models for comput-
ing level-0 distributions of play. We first describe features computed for each of an agent’s
actions, followed by options for combining feature values to obtain a level-0 prediction.
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3.1 Level-0 Features
Most applications of iterative models specify that level-0 agents choose their actions uni-
formly, thus implicitly identifying nonstrategic behavior with uniform randomization. The
core idea of this paper is that nonstrategic behavior need not be uniform. How then might
a nonstrategic agent behave? We argue that agents consider simple rules (features) that
recommend one or more actions, to greater or lesser degrees. We consider both binary
features with range {0, 1} and real-valued features with range R+.
To be eligible for inclusion in our level-0 specification, we require that features not de-
pend on beliefs about how other agents will attempt to maximize their own utility functions.
E.g., the maxmax payoff feature (see below) could be interpreted as a belief that the other
agents will act in such a way that the level-0 agent can maximize its own payoff; however,
this belief does not take the other agents’ utility function into account at all. The minmin
unfairness feature (see below) could be interpreted as a belief that the other agents will
act to minimize unfairness; however, it does not model the other agents as attempting to
maximize their own utility at all.
We restrict our attention to features that can be computed directly from the normal
form of the game, and which do not depend on presentation details such as the units in
which payoffs are expressed or the order in which actions are presented. This allows for
more accurate analysis of strategic models, even when details of presentation are unknown
or not yet known. We do not claim that the features that we investigated comprise an
exhaustive list of factors that could influence nonstrategic agents’ actions.
For each feature, we briefly describe its motivation and then formally define it. Many
of our features have been investigated in both the classical and behavioral game theory
literature in other contexts. In particular, the maxmax payoff, maxmin payoff, and maxmax
welfare features correspond to the Optimistic, Pessimistic, and Altruistic nonstrategic types
in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). Other features, such as the max-symmetric feature, were
influenced by introspection about paradigmatic games such as the Traveler’s Dilemma.
For each feature, we define both a binary version and a real-valued version. Unlike a
binary feature, where a criterion must be maximized in order to be recommended, with
a real-valued feature an action will be recommended to the degree that it maximizes a
criterion. This addresses the intuition that two very high payoff actions may both be
attractive, even if one offers marginally higher payoff than the other.
Some real-valued features represent quantities that an agent would wish to minimize,
rather than maximizing. We apply the inv transformation to these features, where inv is
defined differently depending upon how features will be combined. If feature values will
be combined linearly, then inv(x) = 1/x. If feature values will be combined with a logit
function, then inv(x) = −x.
Maxmin payoff. A maxmin action for agent i is the action with the best worst-case
guarantee. That is,
fmaxmin(ai) =
{
1 if ai ∈ arg maxa′i∈Ai mina−i∈A−i ui(a′i, a−i),
0 otherwise.
7
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This is the safest single action to play against a hostile agent.2 The real-valued version of
this feature returns the worst-case payoff for an action:
fmin(ai) = min
a−i∈A−i
ui(ai, a−i).
Maxmax payoff. In contrast, a maxmax action for agent i is the action with the best
best case. That is,
fmaxmax(ai) =
{
1 if ai ∈ arg maxa′i∈Ai maxa−i∈A−i ui(a′i, a−i),
0 otherwise.
An agent who aims to maximize his possible payoff will play a maxmax action. The real-
valued version of this feature returns the best-case payoff for an action:
fmax(ai) = max
a−i∈A−i
ui(ai, a−i).
Minimax regret. Savage (1951) proposed the minimax regret criterion for making deci-
sions in the absence of probabilistic beliefs. In a game theoretic context, it works as follows.
For each action profile, an agent has a possible regret : how much more utility could the
agent have gained by playing the best response to the other agents’ actions? Each of the
agent’s actions is therefore associated with a vector of possible regrets, one for each possible
profile of the other agents’ actions. A minimax regret action is an action whose maximum
regret (in the vector of possible regrets) is minimal. That is, if
r(ai, a−i) = ui(ai, a−i)− max
a∗i∈Ai
ui(a
∗
i , a−i)
is the regret of agent i in action profile (ai, a−i), then
fmmr(ai) =
{
1 if ai ∈ arg mina′i∈Ai maxa−i∈A−i r(ai, a−i),
0 otherwise.
The real-valued version of this feature returns the worst-case regret for playing an action:
fmr(ai) = inv
[
max
a−i∈A−i
r(ai, a−i)
]
.
Higher max regret is less desirable than lower max regret, explaining our use of the inv
transformation.
Minmin unfairness. Concern for the fairness of outcomes is a common feature of human
play in strategic situations, as has been confirmed in multiple behavioral studies, most fa-
mously in the Ultimatum game (Thaler, 1988; Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Let the unfairness
2. Often, a mixed strategy will be safer still against a hostile agent. However, in this application we are
not actually trying to find a safest strategy for the agent. Rather, we are trying to specify features of
individual actions that might make them attractive to nonstrategic agents.
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of an action profile be the difference between the maximum and minimum payoffs among
the agents under that action profile:
d(a) = max
i,j∈N
ui(a)− uj(a).
Then a fair outcome minimizes this difference in utilities. The minmin unfairness feature
selects every action which is part of a minimally unfair action profile.
f fair(ai) =
{
1 if ai ∈ arg mina′i∈Ai mina−i∈A−i d(a′i, a−i),
0 otherwise.
The real-valued version of this feature returns the minimum unfairness that could result
from playing a given action:
funfair(ai) = inv
[
min
a−i∈A−i
d(ai, a−i)
]
.
Unfairness is a quantity to be minimized, so we apply the inv transformation.
Max symmetric. People often reason about what would happen if the other agent acted
as they did.3 A max-symmetric action is simply the best such action:
fmaxsymm(ai) =
{
1 if ai ∈ arg maxa′i∈Ai u(a′i, . . . , a′i),
0 otherwise.
The real-valued version of this feature returns the symmetric payoff of an action:
f symm(ai) = u(ai, . . . , ai).
Maxmax welfare. Finally, one reason that a nonstrategic agent might find an action
profile desirable is that it produces the best overall benefit to the pair of agents. The maxmax
welfare feature selects every action that is part of some action profile that maximizes the
sum of utilities:
f efficient(ai) =
{
1 if ai ∈ arg maxa′i∈Ai maxa−i∈A−i
∑
j∈N uj(a
′
i, a−i),
0 otherwise.
The real-valued version of this feature returns the maximum welfare that could result from
playing a given action:
fwelfare(ai) = max
a−i∈A−i
∑
j∈N
uj(ai, a−i).
3. This is a concept that only applies to symmetric games, in which agents have identical action sets, and
each agent’s payoff matrix is the transpose of the other.
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3.2 Combining Feature Values
Once a set of features have been computed for each of a set of actions, their values must
be combined to yield a single distribution over actions. There is an infinite number of ways
to perform such a combination. We considered two functional forms, inspired by linear
regression and logit regression respectively.
Both specifications accept a set of features and a set of weights. Let F be a set of
features mapping from an action to R+. For each feature f ∈ F , let wf ∈ [0, 1] be a weight
parameter. Let
∑
f∈F wf ≤ 1, and let w0 = 1−
∑
f∈F wf .
The first functional form produces a level-0 prediction over actions for a given agent by
taking a weighted sum of feature outputs for each action and then normalizing to produce
a distribution.
Definition 3 (Weighted linear level-0 specification). The weighted linear level-0 specifica-
tion predicts the following distribution of actions for level-0 agents:
pilinear,Fi,0 (ai) =
w0 +
∑
f∈F wff(ai)∑
a′i∈Ai
[
w0 +
∑
f∈F wff(a
′
i)
] .
The second functional form assigns a level-0 probability proportional to the exponential
of a weighted sum of feature values.
Definition 4 (Logit level-0 specification). The logit level-0 specification predicts the fol-
lowing distribution of actions for level-0 agents:
pilogit,Fi,0 (ai) =
exp(w0 +
∑
f∈F wff(ai))∑
a′i∈Ai exp(w0 +
∑
f∈F wff(ai))
.
3.3 Feature Transformations
In addition to two functional forms for combining the feature values, we also evaluated two
transformations to feature values. These transformations may be applied to each feature
value before they are weighted and combined.
The first transformation zeroes out features that have the same value for every action,
which we call uninformative. The intuition behind this transformation is that informative
features should have a greater influence on the prediction precisely when the other features
are less informative.
Definition 5 (Informativeness feature transformation). A feature f is informative in a
game G if there exists a′i, a
′′
i ∈ Ai such that f(a′i) 6= f(a′′i ). The informativeness trans-
formation I(f) of a feature f returns the feature’s value when it is informative, and zero
otherwise:
I(f)(ai) =
{
f(ai) if ∃a′i, a′′i ∈ Ai : f(a′i) 6= f(a′′i ),
0 otherwise.
The second transformation normalizes feature values to [0, 1]. This limits the degree to
which one real-valued feature can overwhelm other features.
10
Models of Level-0 Behavior
10108
10110
10112
10114
10116
10118
10120
10122
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t o
ve
r u
.a
.r.
Number of parameters
Model performance
Efficient frontier
uniform
RN
W
F M
S
RN
RFMS
RWRM
MWWS
NW
WF NF
MN NS
MF
RS
FS
RFS MFS
NFS WFS
MWFSRWFS
RNFS
NWFS
RMFS
MNFS
RNWFS
RMNWS
RMNWF
RMWFS
RMNFS
MNWFS
RMNWFS
Figure 1: Prediction performance with 95% confidence intervals for Spike-Poisson QCH ex-
tended by binary features. Points are labeled by a code indicating which features
were included: (M) maxmax payoff; (N) maxmin payoff; (R) minmax regret; (W)
maxmax welfare; (F) minmin unfairness; (S) max symmetric.
Definition 6 (Normalized activation feature transformation). The normalized activation
transformation N(f) constrains a feature f to take nonnegative values that sum to 1 across
all of a game’s actions:
N(f)(ai) =
f(ai)∑
a′i∈Ai f(a
′
i)
.
4. Model Selection
We took two approaches to constructing a model from the candidate features, functional
forms, and transformations described in the previous section. First, we performed forward
selection of binary features, using a linear functional form and informativeness transforma-
tion. We chose this functional form based on a manual evaluation we performed in the con-
ference version of this paper (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2014), in which a linear functional
form and normalized-activation- and informativeness-transformed binary features yielded
good performance. Second, we performed Bayesian optimization to automatically evaluate
combinations from the full set of candidate features, functional forms, and transformations.
4.1 Forward Selection
We performed forward selection using the following procedure. We evaluated the test per-
formance of the Spike-Poisson QCH model, extended by a linear, normalized-activation-
and informativeness-transformed level-0 model using every one- and two-element subset of
11
Wright & Leyton-Brown
10110
10112
10114
10116
10118
10120
10122
10124
10126
unif S FS EFS MNFS MNEFS RMNEFS
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t
training performance
test performance
Figure 2: Training and test performance with 95% confidence intervals for Spike-Poisson
QCH extended by binary features, for the best performing set of features at each
number of features.
the binary features from Section 3.1. The best such model used the minmin unfairness and
max symmetric features. We then evaluated every combination of features that contained
those two features. The results are shown in Figure 1.
The best performing linear model found by forward selection contained four features:
maxmax payoff, maxmin payoff, minmin unfairness, and max symmetric. We will refer
to this model henceforth as linear4. Adding further features did not improve prediction
performance. Figure 2 shows the training and test performance for the best-performing
model at each number of features. Notice that the training performance increased with every
additional feature, whereas after the four-feature model the test performance decreased.
This confirms that overfitting was the cause of the performance decrease.4
4.2 Bayesian Optimization
We performed Bayesian optimization using SMAC (Hutter et al., 2010, 2011, 2012), a
software package for optimizing the configuration of algorithms. SMAC evaluates each
configuration on a randomly-chosen instance (i.e., input to the algorithm); it then updates
a random forest model of predicted performance for configurations. It determines which
configurations to evaluate based on the performance model.
We ran 16 parallel SMAC processes for 1200 hours each. The processes shared the
results of each run they performed. In the context of choosing a level-0 specification, a
4. It might seem obvious that a drop in test performance for more general models must imply overfitting.
However, it could also indicate underfitting, where we simply do a worse job of optimizing the more
complex models. It is this latter possibility that Figure 2 rules out.
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Figure 3: Prediction performance with 95% confidence intervals for Spike-Poisson QCH
extended by features, functional form, and feature transformations selected by
Bayesian optimization. We show only models that were at any point “incumbent”
(i.e., the best found by SMAC at some point in time).
configuration is a set of features, a set of feature transformations, and a functional form
choice. An instance is a subfold : a seed used to randomly divide the All10 dataset into
10 folds; an index indicating which fold is the test fold; and an index indicating which
subdivision of the training folds to use as the validation fold. The specified configuration
was trained on the training data minus the validation fold; the performance of the trained
model on the validation fold was then output to SMAC. The test fold was ignored. In this
way, we attempted to avoid overfitting our dataset during model selection, by never using the
test fold that we used for our final model evaluations to evaluate candidate configurations.
Figure 3 shows the results of the Bayesian optimization process. The best-performing
model found by SMAC was a 13-parameter model that contained the same four binary fea-
tures as linear4, plus all of the real-valued features described in Section 3.1. It combined
the features linearly, with both the normalized-activation and informativeness transforma-
tions. We refer to this model as smac.
We were intrigued that SMAC’s best-performing model was essentially linear4, aug-
mented by real-valued features. We hypothesized that linear4 augmented by real-valued
versions of its four binary features only (i.e., excluding the welfare and max-regret features)
would perform as well or better as smac. This model, which we refer to as linear8, was
not checked by SMAC, and so we checked it manually. As shown in Figure 3, there was
no significant difference between the performance of linear8 and smac (although smac did
insignificantly outperform linear8), even though linear8 has two fewer features. For the
remainder of the paper, we focus our attention on the linear4 and linear8 models.
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Figure 4: Average likelihood ratios of model predictions to random predictions, with 95%
confidence intervals. Results are shown for three different iterative models (Pois-
son cognitive hierarchy (Camerer et al., 2004), level-k (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001),
and Spike-Poisson quantal cognitive hierarchy (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2016))
using three different level-0 specifications (uniform randomization, linear4 from
Section 4.1, and linear8 from Section 4.2).
4.3 Extended Model Performance
We compared the predictive performance of three iterative models using three different
specifications of level-0 behavior. The results are displayed in Figure 4. The y-axis gives the
average ratio of the cross-validated likelihood of the extended models’ predictions divided
by the likelihood of a uniform random prediction. Overall, the linear4 specification yielded
a large performance improvement, both on Spike-Poisson QCH and also on the two other
iterative models. The linear8 specification yielded an additional, smaller performance
improvement. In fact, the two other iterative models benefited disproportionately from the
improved level-0 specifications. Spike-Poisson QCH performed better than the other two
models under all level-0 specifications, but the three models had much more similar (and
improved) performance under the linear4 and linear8 specifications. This is especially
interesting given that the level-0 model was selected based solely on the degree to which it
improved Spike-Poisson QCH’s performance.
4.4 Parameter Analysis
We now examine and interpret the posterior distributions for some of the parameters of the
Spike-Poisson model combined with the linear4 and linear8 level-0 specifications, following
methodology we introduced in prior work (Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2012, 2016).
Figure 5 shows the marginal posterior distribution for each level in the population (up to
level 3), for each of the linear4, linear8, and uniform specifications. We noticed two effects.
First, the posterior distribution of level-0 and level-2 agents was essentially identical under
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Figure 5: Marginal cumulative posterior distributions of levels of reasoning in the All10
dataset, for Spike-Poisson QCH with linear8, linear4, and uniform specifica-
tions.
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Figure 6: Marginal cumulative posterior distributions of the precision parameter (λ) in
the All10 dataset, for Spike-Poisson QCH with linear8, linear4, and uniform
specifications.
the uniform and linear4 specifications, with medians of 0.37. We found this surprising,
since the level-0 agents behave very differently under the two specifications. In contrast,
the posterior distribution of level-0 agents under the linear8 specification had a median
of 0.65, nearly twice as large. Second, there was a large shift of mass (approximately 0.2)
from agents higher than level-3 to level-1 agents under the linear4 specification, and from
all nonzero-level agents to level-0 under the linear8 specification. This may indicate
that models with a uniform level-0 specification were using higher-level agents to simulate
a more accurate level-0 specification.
The precision parameter was very similar between the uniform and linear4 specifica-
tions. It was less sharply identified under the linear4 specification, with mass shifting
toward slightly higher precisions. Quantal response serves two purposes: it accounts for the
errors of reasoning that people actually make and it also provides the error structure for the
model itself. The higher precision may simply reflect the linear4 specification’s improved
accuracy. Under the linear8 specification, the precision parameter is not well identified,
but has a much higher value with high probability. This lack of identification may arise
from the small role played by nonzero agents in this specification.
Figures 7 and 8 show the marginal posterior distribution for the weights of the linear4
and linear8 models respectively on the All10 dataset. As with the distribution over levels,
the posterior distributions on the weight parameters had modes with very narrow supports,
indicating that the data argued consistently for specific ranges of parameter values; the real-
valued fairness feature of the linear8 specification was the exception to this rule. The binary
features had broadly similar weights in both the linear4 and linear8 specifications: the
fairness feature had by far the highest median posterior weight, the maxmax feature had the
second-highest weight, and the max-symmetric and maxmin features both had small and
essentially identical weights, with very overlapping posterior distributions. Interestingly,
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Figure 7: Marginal cumulative posterior distributions over weight parameters of the linear4
specification, for Spike-Poisson QCH on the All10 dataset. The uniform noise
weight is defined implicitly by the other four weights.
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Figure 8: Marginal cumulative posterior distributions over weight parameters of the linear8
specification, for Spike-Poisson QCH on the All10 dataset. The uniform noise
weight is defined implicitly by the other eight weights.
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even though the fairness feature was the highest weighted, it was not selected first by the
forward selection procedure (max symmetric was selected first). This likely indicates that
fairness is more predictive than other features when it is present, but that it is predictive
in fewer games than max symmetric.
The max-payoff and min-payoff real-valued features had very similar posterior weights
in the linear8 specification, with overlapping posterior supports. These were the highest-
weighted features in the linear8 specification. The real-valued fairness feature was not well
identified. The symmetric-payoff feature was well-identified and had a very small weight;
evidently, the action with the highest symmetric payoff is somewhat salient, but the actual
value of the payoff is not salient in itself.
The weight allocated to uniform randomization between the linear8 and linear4 spec-
ifications is very different; the linear4 specification allocates nearly half of its weight to
uniform randomization, whereas for the linear8 specification uniform randomization plays
almost no part. This, combined with the strong similarity in the weighting of binary fea-
tures between the two specifications, suggests that the real-valued features (especially the
max and min payoff features) are playing a genuine role in reducing uncertainty.
5. Related Work
Almost every study that employs iterative reasoning models of either the level-k or cognitive
hierarchy types assumes a uniform distribution of play for level-0 agents. However, there
are a few exceptions. Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) specified truth-telling as the single
salient action in first-price auctions. Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) manually designated
certain actions as “salient” (based on visual features such as “leftmost”) in a hide-and-seek
game. They then estimated an iterative model with a level-0 specification in which level-0
agents play salient actions, with the strengths of each action’s salience estimated under the
assumption that no agent truly plays a level-0 distribution. Arad and Rubinstein (2009)
specified a single action of reinforcing all battlefields equally in a Colonel Blotto game as
the sole level-0 action. Arad and Rubinstein (2012) specified the highest possible request
as the level-0 action in a money-request game where players receive the amount of money
they request, but also receive a relatively large bonus for requesting exactly 1 shekel less
than the other player. Arad (2012) manually specified two “anchor” strategies for a Colonel
Blotto-like game in which players simultaneously assign four representatives to four separate
contests in order of the representatives’ ability.
In spite of the crucial dependence of iterative models upon the specification of the
level-0 distribution, few studies have empirically investigated level-0 play. Agranov, Caplin,
and Tergiman (2010) incentivized subjects to choose an action quickly (and then to revise
it after thinking) by imposing a randomized time limit when playing the beauty-contest
game of Nagel (1995). They hypothesized that early actions represent level-0 choices and
that later actions represent higher-level choices. Based on this assumption, they found
that level-0 behavior did not differ significantly from a uniform distribution. In contrast,
Burchardi and Penczynski (2012) incentivized players to reveal their reasoning by allowing
a one-time simultaneous exchange of messages between teammates playing a beauty-contest
game. Teams of two simultaneously sent each other a single message containing arguments
in favor of a given action, and then simultaneously chose an action, with the team’s action
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being chosen randomly from the two choices. Burchardi and Penczynski then classified each
argument according to level of reasoning, and extracted the level-0 behavior from both level-
0 and higher-level arguments. They found that level-0 play was significantly different from
uniform. Intriguingly, they also found that the level-0 behavior hypothesized by higher-level
players was very similar to the level-0 behavior that was actually proposed.
Hargreaves Heap, Rojo Arjona, and Sugden (2014) evaluate the transferability of level-0
specifications between three games in which all of the actions are strategically equivalent:
a coordination game, a discoordination game, and a hide and seek game. They argue that
any level-0 specification based only on the strategic structure of the game must produce
an identical level-0 behavior for each type of game, since in each game each action is
strategically equivalent to every other action. Based on experimental data, they reject
a joint hypothesis that includes an identical distribution of levels for each game and an
identical level-0 action in each game.5 This may indicate that framing effects, in addition
to strategic considerations, play a role in determining level-0 behavior. It may also indicate
that the population distribution of levels varies between games; we are studying this latter
possibility in ongoing work.
6. Conclusions
This paper’s main contribution is two specifications of level-0 behavior that dramatically
improve the performance of each of the iterative models we evaluated—level-k, cognitive
hierarchy, and quantal cognitive hierarchy. These specifications depend only upon the
payoffs of the game, and are thus generally applicable to any domain, even ones in which
human intuition gives little guidance about the level-0 specification. A linear weighting of
four nonstrategic binary features—maxmax payoff, maxmin payoff, minmin unfairness, and
max symmetric—improved all three models’ performances, with the weaker models (level-k
and cognitive hierarchy) improving the most. Including either or both of the remaining two
binary features caused degradations in prediction performance due to overfitting. Fairness
was the feature with by far the greatest weight. Including real-valued versions of the binary
features further improved prediction performance for all three models at the expense of
nearly doubling the dimensionality of the level-0 specification.
Conventional wisdom in the economics literature says that level-0 agents exist only in
the minds of higher level agents; that is, that a level-0 specification acts solely as a starting
point for higher level agents’ strategies. Our results argue against this point of view: the
best performing model estimated that more than a third of the agents were level-0. These
results are strong evidence that nonstrategic behavior is an important aspect of human
behavior, even in strategic settings. Further refining our understanding of nonstrategic
behavior is an important direction for future work, both for the factors that are considered
by nonstrategic agents, and for the details of incorporating these factors into predictive
behavioral models.
5. They initially assume that no level-0 agents exist as part of their joint hypothesis. However, their results
are robust to the existence of level-0 agents.
19
Wright & Leyton-Brown
Acknowledgements
This work was funded in part by a Canada Graduate Scholarship from the Natural Sci-
ences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and a Four Year Fellowship from the
University of British Columbia.
Bibliography
Agranov, M., Caplin, A., & Tergiman, C. (2010). The process of choice in guessing
games. Social science working paper 1334r, California Institute of Technology.
Available at http://www.wordsmatter.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1334R.pdf, ac-
cessed Feb. 9, 2014.
Arad, A. (2012). The tennis coach problem: A game-theoretic and experimental study. The
BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 12 (1).
Arad, A., & Rubinstein, A. (2009). Colonel Blotto’s top secret files. Working paper.
Available at http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4814577000000000432.pdf,
accessed Feb. 9, 2014.
Arad, A., & Rubinstein, A. (2012). The 11–20 money request game: A level-k reasoning
study. The American Economic Review, 102 (7), 3561–3573.
Burchardi, K., & Penczynski, S. (2012). Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning
in one shot games. Working paper, London School of Economics. Available at http:
//people.su.se/~kburc/research/BurchardiPenczynski2012.pdf, accessed Feb.
9, 2014.
Camerer, C., Ho, T., & Chong, J. (2004). A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 119 (3), 861–898.
Camerer, C., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and manners. The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (2), 209–219.
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.
Princeton University Press.
Cooper, D., & Van Huyck, J. (2003). Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and
extensive form representation of games. Journal of Economic Theory, 110 (2), 290–
308.
Costa-Gomes, M., Crawford, V., & Broseta, B. (2001). Cognition and behavior in normal-
form games: An experimental study. Econometrica, 69 (5), 1193–1235.
Costa-Gomes, M., Crawford, V., & Broseta, B. (1998). Cognition and behavior in normal-
form games: an experimental study. Discussion paper 98-22, University of California,
San Diego.
Costa-Gomes, M. A., & Weizsa¨cker, G. (2008). Stated beliefs and play in normal-form
games. The Review of Economic Studies, 75 (3), 729–762.
Crawford, V., & Iriberri, N. (2007a). Fatal attraction: Salience, naivete, and sophistication
in experimental “hide-and-seek” games. American Economic Review, 97 (5), 1731–
1750.
20
Models of Level-0 Behavior
Crawford, V., & Iriberri, N. (2007b). Level-k auctions: Can a nonequilibrium model of
strategic thinking explain the winner’s curse and overbidding in private-value auc-
tions?. Econometrica, 75 (6), 1721–1770.
Gal, Y., & Pfeffer, A. (2007). Modeling reciprocal behavior in human bilateral negotiation.
In Proceedings of the 22nd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 815–820.
AAAI Press.
Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (2001). Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive
contradictions. American Economic Review, 91 (5), 1402–1422.
Hansen, N., & Ostermeier, A. (2001). Completely derandomized self-adaptation in evolution
strategies. Evolutionary Computation, 9 (2), 159–195.
Hargreaves Heap, S., Rojo Arjona, D., & Sugden, R. (2014). How portable is level-0 behav-
ior? a test of level-k theory in games with non-neutral frames. Econometrica, 82 (3),
1133–1151.
Haruvy, E., & Stahl, D. (2007). Equilibrium selection and bounded rationality in symmetric
normal-form games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62 (1), 98–119.
Haruvy, E., Stahl, D., & Wilson, P. (2001). Modeling and testing for heterogeneity in
observed strategic behavior. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83 (1), 146–157.
Hutter, F., Hoos, H. H., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2010). Sequential model-based optimiza-
tion for general algorithm configuration (extended version). Tech. rep. TR-2010-10,
University of British Columbia, Department of Computer Science. Available online:
http://www.cs.ubc.ca/˜hutter/papers/10-TR-SMAC.pdf.
Hutter, F., Hoos, H. H., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2011). Sequential model-based optimization
for general algorithm configuration. In Proc. of LION-5, p. 507523.
Hutter, F., Hoos, H. H., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2012). Parallel algorithm configuration. In
Proc. of LION-6, pp. 55–70.
Jain, M., Tsai, J., Pita, J., Kiekintveld, C., Rathi, S., Tambe, M., & Ordo´n˜ez, F. (2010).
Software assistants for randomized patrol planning for the LAX airport police and
the federal air marshal service. Interfaces, 40 (4), 267–290.
Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study. American Economic
Review, 85 (5), 1313–1326.
Neal, R. M. (2001). Annealed importance sampling. Statistics and Computing, 11 (2),
125–139.
Pita, J., Jain, M., Marecki, J., Ordo´n˜ez, F., Portway, C., Tambe, M., Western, C., Paruchuri,
P., & Kraus, S. (2008). Deployed armor protection: the application of a game theoretic
model for security at the los angeles international airport. In Proceedings of the
7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems:
industrial track, pp. 125–132. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems.
Robert, C. P., & Casella, G. (2004). Monte Carlo statistical methods. Springer Verlag.
21
Wright & Leyton-Brown
Rogers, B. W., Palfrey, T. R., & Camerer, C. F. (2009). Heterogeneous quantal response
equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (4), 1440–
1467.
Savage, L. (1951). The Theory of Statistical Decision. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 46 (253), 55–67.
Stahl, D., & Wilson, P. (1994). Experimental evidence on players’ models of other players.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25 (3), 309–327.
Stahl, D., & Haruvy, E. (2008). Level-n bounded rationality and dominated strategies in
normal-form games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 66 (2), 226–232.
Stahl, D., & Wilson, P. (1995). On players’ models of other players: Theory and experimental
evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1), 218–254.
Thaler, R. H. (1988). Anomalies: The ultimatum game. The Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 2 (4), 195–206.
Witten, I. H., & Frank, E. (2000). Data Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and
Techniques with Java Implementations. Morgan Kaufmann.
Wolpert, D. H., & Bono, J. W. (2013). Predicting behavior in unstructured bargaining with
a probability distribution. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 46, 579–605.
Wright, J. R., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2012). Behavioral game-theoretic models: A Bayesian
framework for parameter analysis. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Vol. 2, pp. 921–928.
Wright, J. R., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2014). Level-0 meta-models for predicting human
behavior in games. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics
and Computation (EC’14), pp. 857–874.
Wright, J. R., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2016). Predicting human behavior in unre-
peated normal-form games. Working paper, University of British Columbia.
arXiv:1306.0918v3 [cs.GT].
Yang, R., Kiekintveld, C., Ordo´n˜ez, F., Tambe, M., & John, R. (2013). Improving resource
allocation strategies against human adversaries in security games: An extended study.
Artificial Intelligence, 195, 440–469.
Yin, Z., Jiang, A. X., Tambe, M., Kiekintveld, C., Leyton-Brown, K., Sandholm, T., &
Sullivan, J. P. (2012). TRUSTS: Scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in
transit systems using game theory. AI Magazine, 33 (4), 59.
22
